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Abstract Can evolutionary theory be properly characterised as a “theory of forces”, like Newtonian 
mechanics? One common criticism to this claim concerns the possibility to conceive genetic drift as a 
causal process endowed by a specific magnitude and direction. In this article, we aim to offer an original 
response to this criticism by pointing out a connection between the notion of force and the notion of 
explanatory depth, as depicted in Hitchcock and Woodward’s manipulationist account of causal 
explanation. In a nutshell, our argument is that, since force-explanations can be consistently reframed 
as deep explanations and vice versa, and the notion of drift can be characterised in manipulationist terms 
as constitutively intervening in evolutionary deep explanations, then drift-explanations can be 
consistently reframed as force-explanations, and drift can be properly considered as a force of evolution. 
Insofar as similar considerations may be extended also to other evolutionary factors – chiefly selection 






Wondering about the explanatory structure of evolutionary theory – that is, roughly, the way 
in which it provides patterns of explanation applicable to a wide set of phenomena (Kitcher 
1989) –, many authors have depicted it as a dynamical theory or, in other words, as a theory of 
forces. According to Elliott Sober (who popularised this conception in the philosophy of 
biology):   
 
A theory of forces begins with a claim about what will happen to a system when no forces act 
on it. The theory then specifies what effects each possible force will have when it acts alone. 
Then the theory progresses to a treatment of the pairwise effects of forces, then to triples, and 
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so on, until all possible forces treated by the theory are taken into account. Since most objects 
in the real world are bombarded by a multiplicity of forces, this increase in complexity brings 
with it an increase in realism (Sober 1984, p. 31; emphasis in the original). 
 
Taking Newtonian mechanics as the paradigmatic example, we could say that a theory of forces 
must include: 
 
• a first law – the zero-force law – describing how the system behaves when no forces 
act on it (i.e., in the case of Newtonian mechanics, the principle of inertia); 
• a (or a set of) consequence law(s) that describe the direction, the magnitude and the 
outcome of the forces acting in the system (exemplified in classical mechanics by 
Newton’s second law); 
• a causal characterisation of the acting forces (e.g., the laws of gravitation, buoyancy 
etc.). 
 
Likewise, we might consider the Hardy-Weinberg principle as the zero-force law of 
evolutionary theory, the equations calculating the effects of selection, drift, mutation, 
recombination and migration in population genetics as its consequence laws, and specific 
ecological configurations instantiating these laws as the causal characterisation of the theory 
(Caponi 2014). According to a common conception, in Newtonian mechanics the notion of 
force is explanatory because it subsumes the possible causes of change in motion under specific 
theoretical/nomological descriptions. Analogously, according to the dynamical interpretation 
of evolutionary theory, evolutionary forces would conceptually subsume sets of ecological 
factors according to their effects, thus allowing unified causal explanations of the changes in 
genotypic and phenotypic distributions. In spite of its apparent plausibility (many textbooks of 
evolutionary biology and population genetics adopt the force analogy; see, for instance, 
Gillespie 2004; Rice 2004; Futuyma 2005; Hartl and Clark 2007), this view has been 
nonetheless repeatedly questioned. On the one hand, the so-called statisticalists (Matthen and 
Ariew 2002; Walsh et al. 2002) have argued that a clear-cut causal characterisation of selection 
and drift is unviable. Since, as we have just seen, a well-defined notion of force depends on the 
identification of the specific kind of causal process instantiating it, if the statisticalists were 
right, the dynamical interpretation would be untenable. On the other hand, Brandon (2006), 
who defends a heterodox version of the dynamical interpretation, has more specifically denied 
that drift may be considered as a force because – differently from Newtonian forces – it lacks 
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predictable and constant direction.  
In this paper, we aim to defend a rather standard version of the dynamical interpretation 
from these criticisms by showing that genetic drift can be genuinely characterised as a force. 
Many authors have attempted to do this before. On the one hand, against the statisticalist view, 
Reisman and Forber (2005) and Shapiro and Sober (2007) have argued – by invoking 
Woodward’s (2003) manipulationist (or interventionist) theory of causation – that it is possible 
to offer a clear causal characterisation of drift as the process that, depending on the size of a 
population, may produce proportional fluctuations in genetic and phenotypic distributions. On 
the other hand, Stephens (2004, 2010), Filler (2009), Hitchcock and Velasco (2014), Pence 
(2016) and Roffé (2017) have defended the directional features of drift against Brandon’s 
criticism. Stephens (2004, 2010), Filler (2009) and Roffé (2017) have championed the view 
that drift has a direction because it “pushes and pulls” populations towards homozygosity. 
Hitchcock and Velasco (2014) and Pence (2016), by contrast, have argued that, differently 
from Newtonian traditional forces, drift has a stochastic direction, like Brownian motion.  
These two sets of solutions are in our opinion only partially satisfactory. Reisman, Forber, 
Shapiro and Sober may have well succeeded in defending the causal character of drift, but they 
do not clearly defend the thesis that it can be considered as a force1; while the authors who 
focused on directionality do not provide an explicit characterisation of the causal features of 
drift. Our goal is to offer a synthesis of the two approaches, in order to overcome their 
limitations: we aim to argue that drift is a force because it is a cause of a certain kind. In a 
nutshell, we shall support this claim by pointing out a connection between the notion of force 
and the notion of explanatory depth interpreted in manipulationist terms (see especially 
Hitchcock and Woodward 2003). Our argument is that, since the notion of force in Newtonian 
mechanics is what allows this theory to provide deep explanations, and given that the notion 
of drift plays an analogous role in evolutionary theory, then drift can be considered as a force 
of evolution. Insofar as our analysis applies to other evolutionary factors – e.g., selection and 
mutation –, it offers overall support to the dynamical interpretation.  
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In section 1, we spell out in more detail the 
statisticalists’ and Brandon’s criticisms to the interpretation of drift as a force. In section 2, we 
outline the replies to these criticisms and situate our proposal within this context. In section 3, 
we introduce the manipulationist account of explanatory depth. In section 4, we discuss in what 
 
1 Shapiro and Sober (2007) are nominally committed to the force analogy. Yet, besides their manipulationist 
argument for considering drift as a cause, they do not provide any further strong reason to conceive it, in addition, 
as a force. 
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sense the notion of force endows Newtonian mechanics’ explanations with explanatory depth. 
In section 5, we show how to apply our analysis to drift. In the conclusion, we sketch out how 
our approach can be generalised to other evolutionary forces. 
 
 
9.2 Drift as a force and its enemies 
 
The dynamical interpretation of evolutionary theory has been under attack particularly in the 
last two decades (a notable exception is Endler 1986). The disagreement between dynamicalists 
and statisticalists covers quite a broad set of issues, but here we shall focus, for obvious reasons, 
just on those which concern the possibility of considering genetic drift as a force. As we have 
seen in the introduction, a force is a cause that, in the context of a theory, is usually 
characterised as acting with a certain magnitude and direction. Statisticalists are sceptical about 
both the claim that drift is a cause (or, more precisely, that it is a cause clearly differentiable 
from selection) and the claim that it has a predictable and constant direction. We shall start by 
introducing the criticisms levelled by statisticalists against the former claim while reserving 
the criticisms concerning the latter for later in the section in connection with Brandon’s 
criticisms. 
Arguments against the causal interpretation of drift can be found in a number of 
statisticalists’ papers, but we shall mainly refer to the articles by Walsh, Lewens and Ariew 
(2002) and Matthen and Ariew (2002). In their view, drift is nothing more than sampling error, 
thus a purely statistical (as opposed to causal) concept. In order to illustrate their point, the 
statisticalists compare evolutionary processes to series of coin tosses. If we toss a fair coin for 
a large number of times, it is overwhelmingly likely that we will obtain a ratio of heads and 
tails very close to 50:50 (albeit not necessarily 50:50). Likewise, in an infinitely large and 
panmictic population an advantageous allele will, over a certain number of generations, almost 
certainly reach fixation by natural selection. Nonetheless, if we reduce, in the first case, the 
number of the tosses and, in the second, the size of the population, these outcomes will become 
increasingly less likely: “the law of large numbers tells us that the likelihood of significant 
divergence from these predictions is an inverse function of the size of the population. The small 
size of a population increases the chances of error” (Walsh et al. 2002, p. 459). If we toss the 
coin just, say, four times, any distribution of heads and tails is almost equally likely. 
Analogously, the change of allelic distributions in a small population over a certain number of 
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generations will not necessarily reflect the differences in fitness between them. From the 
statisticalist standpoint, it is precisely this deviation from the expectation what evolutionary 
biologists usually call genetic drift. 
Now, the statisticalists stress that, although there obviously are physical factors that cause 
each single toss of the coin to land either head or tail, they are irrelevant to explain the 
differences in the expected outcome in short or large series of tosses. As a matter of fact, the 
same kind of physical factors cause a coin to land head or tail in different series of tosses. What 
explains the differences in the expected outcomes is the number of tosses, which is not – 
properly speaking – a causal but rather a structural feature of the experimental setup. This 
conclusion can be easily extended to drift. Although an evolutionary outcome is obviously 
instantiated by a set of births, deaths and reproductions, what explains the fact that in a small 
population the expected allelic distributions over a certain number of generations diverges from 
the outcome predicted by differences in fitness is not that set of causal factors, but the size of 
the population. The latter, in its turn, does not properly play a causal role, but just define – to 
use a phrase by Anya Plutynski – “a condition on the possibility of sampling error” (2007, p. 
165; emphasis in the original). Since, moreover – as in the case of the coin – the causal factors 
supposedly acting when the sample is small or large are exactly the same (i.e., myriads of 
births, deaths and reproduction), it is impossible to distinguish in any intermediate case if the 
evolutionary process is due to drift or selection. But, if drift and selection are not clearly 
differentiable at a causal level – the statisticalists conclude – then they cannot count as distinct 
forces: instead, they both just denote statistical outcomes. 
Against the dynamical interpretation, the statisticalists also observe that, due to its non-
deterministic nature, differently from Newtonian forces, drift lacks a predictable and constant 
direction. To be fair, Sober himself acknowledged this point, although he simply drew the moral 
that, when compared to selection and other evolutionary forces, drift “is a force of a different 
colour” (1984, p. 117). Of a different opinion is Stephens (2004), who first pointed out – in the 
context of the present debate – that, relying on elementary population genetic models (basically 
the classic Wright-Fisher model), it is possible to say that drift’s direction is homozygosity. 
Given a two-gene locus not subject to selective pressure, these mathematical models predict 
that, after a certain number of generations, one of the two alleles eventually reaches fixation, 
while the other disappears – albeit we cannot predict which one. The main argument against 
this characterisation of drift’s direction has been provided, as anticipated, by Brandon (2006; 
see also Brandon 2010). Differently from the statisticalists, Brandon is not critical of the 
dynamical interpretation as a whole: in a sense, he also believes that evolutionary theory is a 
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theory of forces. His point is rather that drift is equivalent to the principle of inertia of 
evolutionary dynamics instead of a force. Drift cannot be a force in the sense defended by 
Stephens because, if we take seriously the Newtonian analogy, the supposed directionality of 
drift (towards homozygosity) is nonsensical. To claim that, due to drift, either one homozygous 
genotype or the other will, in the long run, predominate in a population (that is, without saying 
which of them will predominate) is problematic. Since Newtonian forces are vectors, it is not 
possible to simply say that a force is acting on an object, without any other qualification. The 
statement that drift is acting on a population, without specifying its direction, is analogously 
meaningless or incomplete. 
 
 
9.3 Causes and forces 
 
As sketched out in the introduction, two main strategies have been deployed in order to defend 
the dynamical interpretation of drift: against the statisticalists, Reisman and Forber (2005) and 
Shapiro and Sober (2007) have argued that the size of a population has not just statistical 
relevance but that it is a genuine causal factor too; against Brandon, some authors have insisted 
on the correctness of Stephens’ analysis (Filler 2009; Stephens 2010; Roffé 2017), while others 
have attempted to liberalise the Newtonian analogy, so as to include “non-canonical” forces 
too (Hitchcock and Velasco 2014; Pence 2016). We shall not pay much attention to this latter 
subset of solutions to Brandon’s challenge since they do not have much to do with our proposal; 
nonetheless – as we shall spell out more clearly below – we share with them the spirit of a 
“liberalisation” of the Newtonian analogy (a position defended also by Luque 2016). 
Reisman and Forber’s and Shapiro and Sober’s attempts to rescue a causal interpretation 
of drift are grounded on the fact that evolutionary biologists do not refer to drift exclusively as 
an effect or as an outcome (see Ohta 2012, for instance). Basically, their goal is to show that, 
contrary to the statisticalists’ view, the size of the population is a genuine causal factor and not 
merely a statistical variable (see also Millstein 2006 for a similar view). In order to do this, 
they need to neutralise the statisticalists’ premise according to which the causes of evolution 
are located uniquely at the level of individuals’ births, deaths and reproductions. To this aim, 
as anticipated, they adopt Woodward’s account of causation and causal explanation (Woodward 
2003). According to Woodward, given two variables X and Y, “a necessary and sufficient 
condition for X to be a direct cause of Y with respect to a variable set V is that there be a 
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possible intervention on X that will change Y or the probability distribution of Y when one 
holds fixed at some value all other variables in V” (2003, p. 55). Woodward’s account allows 
non-local interactions (i.e., those that – unlike the interactions involved in specific coin tosses, 
or in specific sequences of births, deaths and reproductions – do not require the transmission 
of some physical mark or some conserved physical quantity from causes to effects) to be causal. 
The relevant relation in manipulationist causation is, in fact, counterfactual dependence rather 
than production (differently from traditional accounts of causation; cf. Salmon 1986; Dowe 
2000). In this sense, although the size of a population is clearly somehow determined by the 
individuals that compose it, it is nonetheless a genuine causal factor on its own. As illustrated 
by Reisman and Forber through an experiment carried out by Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky 
(1957), it is possible to intervene on the size of a population – while differences in fitness are 
held fixed – in order to increase or decrease the random “fluctuations” of allelic distributions.2 
Since random fluctuations are counterfactually dependent on size, there are no reasons – in 
accordance to Woodward’s account – to deny that drift is a cause. 
Instead of focusing on its causal features, Stephens (2010) and Roffé (2017) argue that 
drift is a force on the grounds that it has indeed a specific direction. While Stephens asserts 
that drift is directed to “remove variation from natural populations” (2010, p. 721) and thus to 
push populations towards homozygosity3, Roffé argues that, although one cannot predict the 
direction which a population evolving by drift will move towards, “when an allele frequency 
is greater than 0.5, it is more likely that this frequency will go up rather than the reverse, even 
in the very next generation” (2017, p. 551). According to Roffé, Brandon is wrong in his 
criticism because, making exception for the case in which – for a two-gene locus – both alleles 
have exactly the same frequency, the prediction of the Wright-Fisher model when drift is at 
work is the increased probability of fixation of the most common allele. A different – and, for 
our purposes, more interesting – defence of drift as a force against Brandon’s attack is given 
by Filler (2009). That a concept may count as a force depends, in his opinion, mainly on the 
fact that it is able to play an appropriate unificatory role concerning a variety of phenomena – 
 
2 Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky separated twenty replicate populations of Drosophila in two groups of ten 
populations each. The first group was composed by large populations, while the second by very small populations 
(10 males and 10 females). Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky aimed to track two allelic types that, initially, were present 
in each population with a ratio of exactly 50:50. By reducing the size of the second group of populations they 
intended to simulate a founder effect (which is usually considered as a common cause of drift). After a certain 
number of generations, they let all the populations grow to the same size. Finally, they let selection act freely and, 
after a number of generations necessary to reach the equilibrium, they recounted type frequencies in each 
population. The result was that, while in large populations the degree of variance between frequencies at 
equilibrium was small, in small populations it was far greater.    
3 Of course, also purifying selection is an eliminative process. Stephens is rather contrasting eliminative forces 
with forces generating variation (e.g., mutation). 
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this criterion was already implicit in Sober’s (1984) original proposal – and that it has a 
precisely mathematically specifiable magnitude. When compared with these criteria, the 
requirement according to which a force must have a specific direction is secondary. Insofar as 
drift unifies disparate phenomena – parent sampling, gamete sampling, founding of new 
populations, splitting of populations etc. – and has a specifiable mathematically precise 
magnitude, the fact that it has not a specific direction (but only a “disjunctive” one; i.e., either 
dominant homozygosity or recessive homozygosity) does not invalidate its status as a force.  
Albeit sympathetic with Filler’s deflationary attitude, Pence (2016) and Luque (2016) are 
sceptical about his specific proposal. They suspect that, by focusing exclusively on 
mathematical magnitude, it weakens too much the criteria for “forcehood”, thus making the 
concept of force trivially applicable and ultimately vacuous. We partly agree with them. In this 
sense, one of our goals in this article may be interpreted as an attempt to find better criteria for 
“forcehood”. Like Filler, we think that one of the crucial features of the notion of force is its 
capacity of unifying various phenomena, by focusing on their shared characteristics. Yet, 
differently from him, we do not believe that the unificatory virtues of the notion of force are 
merely attained through the identification of its mathematical magnitude or its specific 
direction. To be sure, these are important features of a Newtonian force: if Stephens and Roffé 
were right and drift may indeed be conceived as having a specific direction, this would 
obviously strengthen the analogy between evolutionary theory and Newtonian mechanics. But, 
from our point of view, the most salient feature of the notion of force in Newtonian mechanics 
is that it captures certain shared causal characteristics of the phenomena that it unifies.4 In this 
sense, our analysis should be considered as closer to that carried out by Reisman and Forber or 
Shapiro and Sober. As a matter of fact, what we want to show is that the manipulationist account 
of causal explanation provides the conceptual resources to characterise drift not just as a cause 
of evolution, but as a force as well. Forces are “deep causes”, not in the sense that they are 
ontologically “fundamental” (like, for instance, micro-physical interactions), but because they 
are constitutively invoked in deep explanations, that is, explanations able to support a wide 




4 Henceforth, except if otherwise specified, we shall use the word “force” to refer to component forces, and not to 
net forces. As a matter of fact, we take the expression “net force” to denote a theoretical representation of the 
combinatorial effects of interacting forces (as represented in the consequence laws of a theory of forces), while 
only the component forces are causally efficient.  
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9.4 The manipulationist account of explanatory depth 
  
The manipulationist conception of explanatory depth has been initially developed by Hitchcock 
and Woodward (2003; see also Woodward and Hitchcock 2003) and later refined by – among 
others – Woodward (2006, 2010, 2016), Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010), Weslake (2010), and 
Blanchard, Vasilyeva and Lombrozo (2017). It is based on two main assumptions. The first is 
that to explain means to invoke invariant generalisations connecting the explanandum with its 
explanans. The second is that there are straightforward ways to compare the degree of 
invariance of two or more generalisations.  
An invariant generalisation is a statement that captures the counterfactual dependence 
between a variable (a property, an event etc.) and its putative causes. In accordance with what 
we have already seen in the previous section, in the manipulationist framework “a 
generalisation is invariant if it would continue to hold under an appropriate class of changes 
involving interventions on the variables figuring in that generalisation” (Woodward and 
Hitchcock 2003, p. 2; emphasis in the original). Notice that (differently from other 
counterfactual accounts of causation and causal explanation; e.g., Lewis 1986) it is precisely 
the possibility of intervening on the variables figuring in that generalisation what allows to 
establish the counterfactual dependence between an effect and its causes and, thus, guarantees 
the explanatory power of the generalisation. The manipulationist framework does not require 
that interventions must be “physically possible”. Rather, it just requires that they are “logically 
possible and well-defined” (Woodward 2003, p. 128), in the sense that “we have some sort of 
basis for assessing the truth of claims about what would happen if an intervention were carried 
out” (p. 130; emphasis in the original). Explanations of the same phenomenon invoking 
different invariant generalisations can be “more or less explanatory” – that is, they can be 
deeper or less deep – depending on the range of invariance of the generalisations figuring in 
them. In order to understand the concept of “range of invariance”, it is useful to think of an 
invariant generalisation as a linear regression equation: 
 
(1) Y = a1X1 + a2X2 + … + anXn + U  
 
While ax represents fixed coefficients, U is a placeholder for other possible causal influences 
not explicitly taken into account in the equation – that is, background conditions. Interventions 
on the values of Xs determine corresponding changes in the value of Y. By showing how Y 
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covaries with Xs in non-actual situations, invariant generalisations allow to answer a class of 
so-called what-if-things-had-been-different questions. The range of invariance of a 
generalisation is the property of the generalisation that determines, so to speak, “how many” 
what-if questions the generalisation is able to answer.  
The second assumption of the manipulationist conception of explanatory depth is that the 
range of invariance of a generalisation is mainly determined by what different authors call 
insensitivity (Woodward 2006; Ylilkoski and Kourikoski 2010) or stability (Woodward 2010; 
Blanchard et al. 2018).5 An explanatory generalisation is less sensitive, or more stable, than 
another if and only if it makes explicit the counterfactual dependence of the explanandum on 
variables treated as background conditions by the other generalisation. In order to illustrate 
these concepts, let us consider an example proposed by Woodward and Hitchcock (2003). 
Imagine we want to explain why a plant grew up to a certain height and that we know that the 
variable “plant height” is counterfactually dependent on the amount of water and fertiliser the 
plant received. We may represent this invariant generalisation as: 
 
(2) Y = a1X1 + a2X2 + U 
 
Y is the variable “plant height”, a1X1 is a certain amount of water, a2X2 is certain amount of 
fertiliser, and U is a set of background conditions. (2) explains the actual height of the plant by 
supporting a certain class of counterfactuals: if the plant had received a different amount of 
water or fertiliser, it would have reached a different height. In this way, (2) allows answering a 
non-trivial set of what-if questions. Nonetheless, according to Hitchcock and Woodward 
(2003), explanations invoking (2) are quite shallow. The reason is that (2) can be easily 
disrupted:   
 
[2] would fail if we were to spray the plant with weed killer or heat it to a very high 
temperature. Less dramatically, there are many possible conditions that will not destroy the 
plant, but which will alter the effect of water and fertiliser on plant height. There may be 
physical changes in the root system of the plant or the surrounding soil that would change the 
way in which given amounts of water affect plant height (Woodward and Hitchcock 2003, p. 
5). 
 
The problem with (2) is, in brief, that it makes plant height counterfactually dependent on 
 
5 Blanchard et al. (2018) think that stability should be better characterised as denoting two distinct explanatory 
virtues, that is, breadth and guidance. We do not need to enter into such details here. 
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factors (the amount of water and fertiliser) that are extremely sensitive to a change in the 
background conditions. Alternatively, imagine that we have a theory that describes the details 
of the physiological mechanisms governing plant growth by referring to a series of biochemical 
reactions. Such a theory would allow deriving an invariant generalisation like 
 
(3) Y = a1X1 + a2X2 + … + anXn + U’ 
 
where Y is the plant’s height and the Xs denote a set of variables relative to the physiological 
features of the plant, while U’ is a subset of U. (3) might be thought as “unpacking” U in a set 
of known variables such that, being manipulable, explicitly spell out how they interfere in the 
causal outcome (i.e., plant height). In making explicit those variables, (3) allows explaining, 
for instance, how the composition of the soil, temperature, air or noise pollution, presence of 
pests etc. can, in terms of types of biochemical reactions, make a difference to Y. Since it is 
difficult to imagine a generalisation about plant height that takes into account all background 
conditions (consider logically possible metaphysical scenarios such as drastic changes in the 
physical structure of the universe – for instance, a change in the composition of matter or in 
the structure of space), (3) still must include a variable for background U’. Nonetheless, (3) is 
more stable than (2), because it is insensitive to many of those circumstances that disrupted 
(2). Accordingly, an explanation invoking (3) is deeper that an explanation invoking (2) 
because (3) “enable[s] inferences to more counterfactual situations” (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 
2010, p. 209) than (2). 
Explanatory depth is not just related to the stability of the explanatory generalisations, but 
also to the choice of the variables taken into account. In this respect, Hitchcock and Woodward 
observe that “ideally, one would like to formulate generalisations that are not sensitive at all to 
the ways in which the values of the variables figuring in them are produced” (2003, pp. 186-
7). Remember that, in the manipulationist framework, it is precisely the (logical) possibility of 
interventions what allows establishing the counterfactual dependence between an effect and its 
causes. Importantly, variables that can be manipulated independently from the specificity of 
the scenario under study make the generalisation in which they appear portable to other 
scenarios. (2), besides being shallow in the sense that it does not take into account potentially 
disrupting background conditions, is also shallower than the explanation invoking (3) because 
it relates Y to variables quite sensitive to the way in which they are manipulated. Amount of 
water and fertiliser are certainly relevant to explain the height of many plants, but are not 
relevant in all cases (think about, for instance, aquatic plants): the explanation invoking (2) is 
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thus not easily portable to other scenarios relatively analogous to the specific one taken into 
consideration, but different in some important respect. On the contrary, (3), which makes 
reference to certain types of biochemical reactions, captures features of the process of growth 
common to all plants and, therefore, is extremely portable. The reason for this high degree of 
portability is precisely that the conditions of manipulability of the invariant relation are 
abstracted away from the specific growth pattern of the actual plant under study, so as to cover 
analogous phenomena as well. In its turn, portability is achieved because the choice of variables 
concerning biochemical reactions, so to speak, carves nature at its joints by spelling out what 
all phenomena concerning plant growth share. 
Stability and portability of a generalisation are strictly related. Although, as far as we can 
see, not every stable generalisation is also portable, portable generalisations are generally 
stable. We suggest that highly stable and portable generalisations provide the deepest possible 
explanations of a natural phenomenon. This characterisation relates explanatory depth to 
unification. As a matter of fact, stability and portability together account for the ability of a 
generalisation to cover a broad set of phenomena. Differently from Kitcher’s classic account 
of explanatory unification (Kitcher 1989), which makes a generalisation explanatorily deep 
insofar as it is derived from a set of theoretical statements or inferential patterns, the 
manipulationist account derives the unificatory virtues of a class of invariant generalisations 
mainly from their causal features (Woodward 2016). Stable and portable generalisations are 
more frequently encountered in the fundamental sciences, in which phenomena are explained 
by invoking physical properties assumed to be shared by all physical objects (positions, 
velocities, masses, charges etc.). Nonetheless, this is not necessary (Weslake 2010). On the 
contrary, it is precisely the possibility of finding stable and portable generalisations in different 
disciplines what permits, as we shall see starting from the next section, to transpose the notion 
of force to them.6   
 
 
9.5 Force-explanations as deep explanations 
     
In the last section, we have seen that, in order to be deep, an explanation must contain stable 
 
6 Quite clearly, the criteria for explanatory depth here adopted are not metric, i.e., they do not allow arranging 
distinct explanations of a given phenomenon on a univocal scale ranging from the shallowest to the deepest. 
Rather, they have to be interpreted, more modestly, as comparative criteria. This does not mean, as we shall see 
in the next sections, that they cannot be useful as analytic tools.    
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and, possibly, portable generalisations. In this section, we aim to argue that, to the extent that 
they invoke generalisations maximally integrating background conditions, Newtonian 
mechanics explanations allow providing very deep explanations of changes in motion. We 
moreover want to argue that this is precisely because they employ the notion of force, which 
permits to understand the counterfactual dependence between physical effects and its causes 
regardless of how the interventions on the causes are performed. We therefore shall conclude 
that, besides the fact of having a certain direction and magnitude, one of the main 
characteristics (in our opinion, the most fundamental) of the notion of force is the extreme 
portability of the generalisations in which it appears. We believe that this is the characteristic 
that we have to take into account when we assess the possibility of transferring the notion of 
force to other theoretical contexts. 
Let us illustrate our claim with the help of another example presented by Hitchcock and 
Woodward (2003, p. 187-8). Imagine that you drop an object from a certain height and that you 
want to know why it takes a certain time to fall. One way to do this is by invoking the invariant 
generalisation between (X) – the height from which the object has been dropped – and (Y) – 
the time it takes to fall –, also known as Galileo’s law of free fall. This would provide a perfectly 
acceptable explanation of the phenomenon at stake. Nonetheless, the invariant relation 
described by Galileo’s law has a limited range of invariance: “it would fail to hold if the object 
were dropped from a height that is large in relation to the earth’s radius or if it were dropped 
from the surface of a massive body of proportions different from those of earth (such as Mars)” 
(Hitchcock and Woodward 2003, p. 187). Alternatively, we may explain Y by invoking 
Newton’s second law along with his law of gravitation, which describe the behaviour of the 
dropped object in a way that is insensitive to the above-specified potentially disrupting 
background conditions. As a matter of fact, Newton’s law of gravitation remains invariant 
under changes in the mass and radius of the massive object upon which the object is dropped: 
“an intervention that increases the mass of earth would count as an intervention on background 
conditions with respect to Galileo’s law, but as an intervention on a variable explicitly figuring 
in Newton’s laws” (p. 188; emphases in the original). Leaving aside relativistic considerations, 
we could say that, since Newton’s laws are able to take into account all variables relevant to 
explain the behaviour of the dropped object, the explanation invoking Newton’s laws is a very 
deep explanation of the phenomenon.7 No matter which potentially perturbing conditions are 
 
7 In the last section we noticed – regarding our hypothetical generalisations concerning plant height – that some 
background conditions are ineliminable. This is possibly true also of generalisations dealing with more 
fundamental features of the physical world, but we shall not discuss this issue here. 
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made explicit, Newtonian laws are able to show how they are related to the outcome, thus 
enabling inferences concerning any counterfactual situation.  
This, of course, does not apply just to the behaviour of falling bodies. Similar 
considerations can be extended to the behaviour of any material object in a Newtonian 
universe: planets, colliding objects, pendulums, springs etc. The explanations invoking 
Newton’s laws are so deep not just because they are stable but also – and, perhaps, mainly – 
because they are portable. In its turn, they are portable arguably in virtue of the fact that they 
employ the notion of force. As the historian of physics Max Jammer has noticed “the usefulness 
of the concept of ‘force’ is that it enables us to discuss the general laws of motions irrespective 
of the particular physical situation with which these motions are situated” (Jammer 1957, p. 
244; see also Sklar 2013, chap. 6). Within a manipulationist framework, this claim can be 
interpreted as stating that forces are variables that are maximally insensitive to the concrete 
circumstances in which they are manipulated. That is, while the degree of invariance of 
hypothetical pre-Newtonian generalisations relating – without mentioning universal forces – 
the motion of planets, the period and length of a pendulum, the behaviour of a billiard ball after 
a collision, and so forth, would be limited to changes in the specific variants appearing in them 
(as illustrated by less portable generalisations like, besides Galileo’s law, Kepler’s law of 
planetary motion or Huygens’ law of elastic collision), the possibility of conceiving all these 
phenomena as the product of the same forces allows to capture their causes in a highly portable 
form. Any change in motion, in a Newtonian world, can be causally explained by invoking 
generalisations virtually neglecting the specificity of physical bodies (excluding mass, which 
is a property shared by all of them) that we need to manipulate in order to account for the 
relevant phenomena. Any change in motion is simply counterfactually dependent on the 
specific component forces represented by the values of the manipulated variables.  
Differently from Filler and other authors cited in section 2, we think that it is the high 
portability of force-explanations, rather than the fact that forces have magnitude and precise 
direction, what should be taken as the characteristic unificatory feature of the notion of force. 
Again, we do not reject the idea that magnitude and direction are important in the 
characterisation of a force (of course, they are crucial in the representation of Newtonian 
forces), and certainly Stephens and Roffé are right in the claim that if drift had a precise 
direction this would reinforce the analogy between Newtonian mechanics and evolutionary 
theory. In spite of that, our account aims to point out what is a more fundamental feature of 
forces: their ability to provide very deep causal explanations – in the manipulationist sense – 
of a class of phenomena. Surely, the fact that the notion of force allows Newtonian laws to 
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provide such deep explanations of changes in motion does not obviously entail that any concept 
playing an analogous role with respect to another class of phenomena is, ipso facto, a force. 
We think, nonetheless, that it would be reasonable to accept that a concept able to play an 
analogous role may be considered as a force. Even though it seems to us that not many concepts 
can satisfy the conditions to be a force outside physics, we still shall argue that genetic drift is 
one of them.   
 
 
9.6 Drift as a force 
  
Following our argument in the last two sections, we think that the minimal requirement for a 
concept to play the role of a force within a theory is to allow deep explanations of a certain 
class of phenomena. This requirement, in its turn, is satisfied just by those concepts permitting 
to formulate generalisations that are highly stable (thus answering a broad range of what-if 
questions) and portable (i.e., insensitive to the specific ways in which the variables denoted by 
the concept are manipulated). According to this latter criterion, drift would – or, at least, might 
– be reasonably considered as a force if we had a concept able to identify all the causal 
processes that are characteristically and systematically related to stochastic evolutionary 
outcomes.8  
As we have seen in section 2, Reisman and Forber (2005) and Shapiro and Sober (2007) 
rescue the causal character of drift against statisticalists’ criticisms by showing how, by 
adopting a manipulationist framework, the effects of drift, Y – that is, random fluctuations in 
allele frequencies and, possibly, removal of genetic variation and homozygosity – are 
counterfactually dependent on X, the size of the population under study. We may manipulate 
the size of a population by shrinking it, thus increasing the effects of drift, or vice versa we 
may diminish the effects of drift by increasing the size of the population indefinitely, allowing 
selection to act increasingly undisturbed. We think that this characterisation, albeit valuable, 
does not capture the features for which drift can be considered as a force. This is, at least 
partially, because it leaves aside cases in which the effects of drift are not caused by a change 
in the size of the population.  
Many phenomena commonly associated to drift – like parent sampling, gamete sampling, 
 
8 Even though also mutation might be considered as a stochastic process, in traditional population genetic models 
it is commonly conceived as a deterministic one (see, for instance, Hartl and Clark 2007).  
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founding of new populations, splitting of populations, bottlenecks – are indeed often related to 
a reduction of the size of the population. In all such cases, there is a difference between the 
potential and actual reproducers that is captured by the distinction between census and effective 
population size.9 For instance, gamete sampling is the process by which only a percentage of 
the gametes produced is represented in the next generation because some individuals over-
reproduce and others do not at all. So, for example, given a census population size N, the idea 
of gamete sampling is that only the genetic contribution of the effective population size Ne is 
represented in the next generation. Thus, the passage from N to Ne clearly involves a reduction 
in the size of the population. However, significantly, other potential cases might not involve 
reduction of the size of the census population. Suppose for instance that in a small population 
of 10 organisms with equal fitness (e.g., clones) reproducing by parthenogenesis, 9 have one 
offspring but one has mono-ovum twins: in this case, all potential reproducers do as a matter 
of fact reproduce, so all members of the census population do, but one of them reproduces 
more. In this case, there is no reduction of the census population to the effective population as 
the two coincide: in fact, there are 10 potential and 10 actual reproducers. In spite of this, 
because all organisms have equal fitness, we are inclined to consider the evolutionary outcome 
as an instance of drift. Still other cases might involve the expansion of the effective population 
size. For instance, in vitro fertilization allows infertile organisms (i.e., members of the census 
population who are not potential reproducers) to have offspring.  
As a consequence of these considerations, even though population size reduction is 
undoubtedly a good proxy to test drift hypotheses in many cases, it cannot, in our opinion, be 
considered as the cause of drift outcomes. As a matter of fact, we think that population size 
reduction is an effect, rather than a cause, of drift.10 In order to clarify this prima facie 
unintuitive statement, let us introduce what we think are the causes of drift. They are, as a first 
approximation, chance events (in our examples, for instance, the spontaneous division of the 
ovum in two embryos and the availability of a certain technology). With this expression we do 
not refer to indeterministic events (even though they might sometimes be), but rather to the 
 
9 Effective population size can be conceptualized in a variety of ways. When it is estimated that human effective 
population size is around 10.000 individuals (Yu et al. 2004) even though current census size is over 7 billions, 
reference is to the genetic variability in sampled genes. The reason for this discrepancy – already highlighted by 
Wright (Ohta 2012, p. 2) – is that a bottleneck in the history of the lineage drastically reduces effective population 
size. Another, more general and less refined, conceptualisation of effective population size merely draws on the 
difference between potential and actual reproducers. While both ways of conceptualising effective population size 
are legitimate (indeed there are many more, see note 11), the vernacular conceptualisation is sufficient to ground 
our argument. 
10 This is not to say that the size of a population cannot play a causal role in evolutionary dynamics, but just that 
it is not because of the causal role that population size plays that drift can be considered as a force. 
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environmental circumstances (like lightning strikes, floods, droughts, forest fires etc.) and 
reproductive phenomena (like meiosis) instantiating what Millstein (2002, 2005; relying on 
Beatty 1984, 1992; Hodge 1987) calls “indiscriminate sampling”. This characterisation has 
been more or less explicitly endorsed by many population geneticists (e.g., Fisher 1921; Wright 
1932; Dobzhansky 1937; Fisher and Ford 1947). The rationale of this view is that drift, as well 
as natural selection, is an iterative and inter-generational process of sampling of parents or 
gametes in a population. While selection is a process of discriminate sampling – since parents, 
and thus gametes, are sampled according to their differential fitness – drift is indiscriminate 
insofar as the differences in fitness are irrelevant to the sampling process. In an attempt to 
improve Millstein’s proposal, Gildenhuys suggests to consider chance events as non-
interactive, non-pervasive and indiscriminate causes, that is, NINPICs: 
 
[NINPICs] are (i) non-interactive insofar as they have the same sort of causal influence on 
the reproduction of individuals of each type in the population (most are deadly for individuals 
of all types); (ii) non-pervasive insofar as they affect only some population members in any 
given generation or time slice; and (iii) indiscriminate insofar as they are just as likely to 
affect one population member as any other population member, regardless of what variant 
types they are (Gildenhuys 2009, p. 522; emphases in the original). 
 
Thus, for instance, a forest fire is usually considered as a chance event – and, therefore, as a 
cause of drift outcomes – because: (i) potentially, it has the same reproductive effects on each 
type of organism in a population (combustion is virtually lethal for any organism); (ii) in most 
actual cases, it does not affect all population members, but only a subset of them (i.e., those 
that incidentally happen to live in the geographical area affected by the fire); (iii) the chances 
of a population member being affected by the fire are independent from the fact that she has 
any specific genomic or phenotypic property (except, of course, the property of being spatially 
proximal to the geographical area affected by the fire).  
Taking for granted that this is a satisfactory characterisation of the notion of chance events, we 
can ask in what sense NINPICs are causes of the characteristic drift effects. The key to 
understand this is the so-called Kolmogorov forward equation of diffusion theory (Hartl and 
Clark 2007, p. 106 ff.). The equation describes the diffusion of an allele as the sum of two 
functions M(x) and V(x), such that M(x) denotes the effects of systematic forces like selection 
(but also mutation and migration) and V(x) the variance in allele frequency due to binomial 
sampling (that is, drift, as considered in the Wright-Fisher model). Following Gildenhuys 
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(2009, p. 528 ff.), the equation that determines V is p(1-p)/2Nev, where Nev is variance effective 
population size. For simplicity, we shall equate, in our discussion, Nev to Ne.11 Since p (the 
allele frequency) is a kind of background condition, it is Nev (or Ne) the variable that we need 
to know in order to solve Kolmogorov forward equation.  
Let us now turn our attention to what we call a “drift generalisation”; that is – as we said 
at the beginning of this section –, a generalisation able to identify all the causal factors that are 
characteristically and systematically related to stochastic evolutionary outcomes. In 
manipulationist terms, the “stochastic evolutionary outcome” is the Y of a linear regression 
equation of which we need to find the Xs, its causes. If the stochastic evolutionary outcome in 
the Kolmogorov forward equation is V, and Ne is what determines V values, then Y is Ne. This 
is why, as mentioned before, the size of a population – more precisely, the effective size of a 
population – is the effect rather than a cause of drift. It is the variable that, when plugged in the 
Kolmogorov forward equation, amplifies or reduces the stochasticity of the overall 
evolutionary dynamic of the allele under study. Nonetheless, when we consider drift as a cause 
– that is, when we want to know the Xs that produce a change in Ne – we are referring to 
NINPICs, that is, the set of chance events materially responsible for such a change.  
 We can make this claim clearer as follows. One way to understand Ne – both in the Wright-
Fisher model and in diffusion theory – is as a variable that tracks the amount of actual variance 
in progeny number per parents (Charlesworth 2009). Without entering into excessive 
technicalities, we could say that a large amount of variance normally implies a reduced Ne, 
while a small amount implies a large Ne. In other words, variance in progeny number is large 
in the case in which there is a great difference between the number of offspring of the members 
of a population, while in the case in which each parent in a generation has a single offspring 
we have no variance, i.e., the effective population is identical to the census population. 
Nonetheless, the latter is an ideal case; in the real world this rarely, if ever, happens. The 
variance in progeny number may be due to natural selection, but we shall here focus exclusively 
on the variance due to non-selective factors (as usual in population genetics models). These are 
the “chance” events that constitute the causes of drift. The idea is that the NINPICs 
characterisation captures the shared features of all of them in a way that, necessarily, if we 
manipulate NINPICs, the variance in progeny number correspondingly increases or is reduced 
 
11 There exist at least three ways in population genetics to conceptualise effective size: besides variance effective 
population size, they are inbreeding effective population size and eigenvalue effective population size. Although 
they have different functions within population modelling, they all represent the number of actual reproducers in 
contrast with the number of potential reproducers denoted by census population (see note 9). 
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and this, in its turn, stochastically biases the evolutionary dynamics. A small amount of 
NINPICs yields less variance in progeny number and allows maintaining a large Ne, with the 
effect that – in accordance to the Kolmogorov forward equation – (putatively) deterministic 
forces, like selection, act relatively undisturbed. On the contrary, a large amount of NINPICs 
increases the variance in progeny, thereby reducing Ne and – in the case in which the differences 
in fitness between the members of the population are small – producing the fluctuations in 
allele frequencies characteristic of drift. 
Generalisations counterfactually relating effective population size with NINPICs are 
maximally insensitive to background conditions insofar as they leave no potentially disrupting 
factors unconsidered. Although, quite obviously, in a specific situation it is impossible to 
enumerate all the ecological and reproductive factors counting as non-interactive, non-
pervasive and indiscriminate causes, this is an epistemic limitation that does not affect the 
explanatory depth of the invariant generalisation. The invariant generalisation relating effective 
population size to NINPICs just says that, independently from our ability to identify and 
enumerate all these factors, if they have NINPICs characteristics, they are thus causally 
responsible for the fluctuations in effective population size and, if not, they are not. The 
generalisation is nonetheless stable because a change in the NINPICs would necessarily lead 
to a change of effective population size, in any specific evolutionary scenario. The stability of 
such generalisation is, in turn, guaranteed precisely by the availability of a causal notion of 
drift like NINPICs. NINPICs confers the manifold causes of drift the status of a force because, 
paraphrasing Jammer, they enable us to discuss the general effects of drift irrespective of the 





In this chapter, we have defended a notion of force grounded on the manipulationist 
interpretation of explanatory depth. According to this interpretation, an explanation is deep if 
it contains in its explanans an invariant generalisation that is stable (i.e., it is not easily disrupted 
by background factors) and portable (i.e., it contains a description of the causes of the 
explanandum that is highly insensitive to the specific circumstances in which they occurred). 
We have argued that a “force” may be any unitary set of causes of a certain class of phenomena 
such that, when invoked to explain a phenomenon pertaining to this class, it is able to provide 
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a very deep explanation. Hence, we have shown that both Newtonian forces and drift (this latter 
considered as NINPICs) satisfy this condition and, thus, may be properly considered as forces. 
We have suggested that characteristic features of Newtonian forces such as mathematical 
magnitude and direction, albeit important for the formal representation of a force, are 
secondary with respect to its specific explanatory role within the theory. Accordingly, although 
a characterisation of drift as a directional force would surely strengthen the Newtonian analogy, 
a cause may be an instance of a force even without specific direction. This liberalisation of the 
notion of force is, in our opinion, the first step towards a refinement of the dynamical 
interpretation of evolutionary theory free of the burden of having to be completely isomorphic 
to Newtonian theory (in the spirit of authors like Filler 2009; Pence 2016 and Luque 2016).  
 The crucial characteristic of a force is its unificatory causal role. In the case of drift, 
this is achieved by individuating all those causal factors that act unsystematically to perturb 
the (putatively) deterministic evolutionary dynamic of an allele through the fluctuations of the 
effective size of the population under study. We do not intend here to attempt an analysis of the 
other forces of evolution, but it is easy to imagine how it could be extended, for instance, to 
mutation and natural selection. Mutation might be considered a force if stable and portable 
generalisations concerning its evolutionary role were formulated. The intuitive problem at this 
stage is that the processes of genomic change instantiating mutation are multifarious (ranging 
from point mutations to chromosome duplications), even though this variability is somehow 
analogous to the variability of the NINPICs instantiating drift as a process. Mutation affects 
evolutionary dynamics in a way that is clearly conceptually different from that of selection and 
drift for the reason that the focus is on the causal role of genomic change in evolution. 
Interestingly, it has been argued that mutation might bias the evolutionary process (Stoltzfus 
and McCandlish 2017). Consider for instance the preponderance of transitions (i.e., a mutation 
from one purine to another or from one pyrimidine to another) compared to transversions (i.e., 
mutations from a purine to a pyrimidine or vice versa). It has been calculated that transitions 
are three times more common than transversions. If this bias generates a systematic 
evolutionary effect – for instance in the form of a predictable and constant direction –, then we 
can consider mutation as a force.  
Selective causes have the effect of increasing or reducing, in a population, the frequency 
of an allele depending on its overall contribution to the survival and reproduction of the 
individual organisms expressing it phenotypically. Such causes may be instantiated, as in the 
case of drift, in an impressive variety of ecological and developmental ways. It is arguably 
difficult to provide a satisfactory definition of the notion of ecological fitness that could be 
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used to characterise the “discriminateness” of selection against the “indiscriminateness” of 
drift; nonetheless, it is precisely to this shared feature of selective factors that biologists refer 
to when they talk about selection as a cause.  
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